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1 Introduction
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, it has often been argued that fund managers did not
know about the risks in their portfolio; otherwise, it has been argued, they would not have
invested in such risky assets. We argue, however, that fund managers might have known
about the risks and invested in the risky assets nonetheless. We suggest that it might even
have been individually optimal to invest in the risky assets if the expected return on these
assets was lower than the expected return on other, less risky assets.
A fund’s performance is usually compared to the performance of an index or other funds.
If a fund trails the benchmark, the fund manager is often replaced. We argue that this may
lead to excessive risk-taking if fund managers differ in ability and investment restrictions
are inadequate. If investment restrictions are adequate, benchmarking may sort out low-
ability from high-ability fund managers. If, however, investment restrictions are inadequate,
benchmarking may lead to excessive risk-taking. To match the benchmark, fund managers
may increase the risk of their portfolio even if this decreases the expected return on the
portfolio.
Some fund managers, for instance, are restricted to invest in AAA-rated bonds. If
all AAA-rated bonds offer similar yields at a similar risk, benchmarking may sort out low-
ability from high-ability fund managers. If, however, some AAA-rated bonds (e.g. AAA-rated
mortgage-backed securities) offer higher yields at a higher risk, fund managers may invest in
these bonds to match the benchmark even if their expected return is lower than the expected
return on other, less risky AAA-rated bonds.
We consider a model in which fund managers differ in ability and are fired if they miss
the benchmark. Fund managers can create a perfectly diversified portfolio and, in addition,
gamble. High-ability fund managers can create a perfectly diversified portfolio with a higher
return than low-ability fund managers.1 In addition, fund managers have the opportunity
to invest in a risky asset which increases the risk of the overall portfolio and decreases the
expected return on the overall portfolio. Fund managers are fired if the realized return is
lower than the average realized return.2 If a fund manager is fired, the fund manager incurs
1Suppose, for instance, high-ability managers may create a perfectly diversified portfolio at lower costs
than low-ability managers, and investors receive the return of the portfolio net of these costs. Then, high-
ability managers can create such a portfolio with a higher net return than low-ability managers.
2The firing rule is taken as given. If investment restrictions were adequate and fund managers could not
gamble, such a firing rule would sort out low-ability from high-ability fund managers. The main purpose
here, however, is not to design an optimal incentive or sorting scheme; it is to show that benchmarking may
lead to excessive risk-taking if investment restrictions are inadequate.
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costs. Besides, fund managers get a fixed wage, receive a share of profits and also bear a
share of losses.
We find that if the costs of being fired are sufficiently large in relation to the share of
the realized return, there exists no equilibrium in which no fund manager invests in the risky
asset. If there exists a symmetric3 equilibrium in pure strategies, low-ability fund managers,
at least, invest in the risky asset. We find that there exists at least one such equilibrium if
and only if the returns of the risky asset or the probability that the risky asset generates a
high return are sufficiently large.4 (If fund managers do not receive a share of the realized
return, our results hold if fund managers incur positive costs if they are fired.)
There is a substantial literature on incentives in funds management.5 Brown et al.
(1996), for instance, show empirically that fund managers with a bad relative performance
increase risk relative to fund managers with a good relative performance. They informally
argue that fund managers may increase risk because fund inflows are convex in relative per-
formance.6 Taylor (2003) develops a theoretical model in which fund managers compete for
inflows in a winner-takes-all tournament. Taylor finds, however, that in such a setting, fund
managers with a good relative performance are more likely to increase risk than managers
with a bad relative performance. Our model differs from the prevalent point of view. We do
not consider a situation in which fund managers try to be a ‘winner’. We consider a situa-
tion in which fund managers try not to be a ‘loser’. Khorana (1996) documents that fund
managers with a bad relative performance are more likely to be replaced. We suppose that
this influences investment decisions. And in contrast to the predictions of Taylor’s model,
the predictions of our model are consistent with Brown et al.’s empirical finding.
There is a number of models in which low-ability fund managers try to mimic the actions
of high-ability fund managers. Trueman (1988) and Dasgupta and Prat (2006), for instance,
show that fund managers may trade excessively (termed ‘noise trading’ or ‘churning’) because
of career concerns. They argue that low-ability fund managers (who are uninformed about
the future return of a risky asset) may trade in order to appear to have high ability (i.e. to
be informed about the future return of a risky asset). In our model, however, fund managers
do not try to mimic portfolio choices. Instead, they try to mimic portfolio returns.
3That is, all low-ability fund managers make the same investment decision and all high-ability fund
managers make the same investment decision.
4The assumption, however, that an investment in the risky asset decreases the expected return on the
overall portfolio still holds.
5Bhattacharya et al. (2008) provide a good literature overview.
6Sirri and Tufano (1998) among others, show empirically that fund inflows are indeed convex in relative
performance.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model in which
fund managers differ in ability, have the opportunity to take excessive risk, and are fired if
they miss the benchmark. In section 3, we examine investment decisions and characterize
possible equilibria. In section 4, we conclude and highlight the importance of adequate
investment restrictions. Proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 The model
Consider a model with many fund managers. The managers differ in ability, have the op-
portunity to take excessive risk, and are fired if they miss the benchmark.
There are two types of managers who differ in their ability θ, θ ∈ {θL, θH}, θH > θL.
Of each type, there is a continuum of mass 1. (That is, half of managers have high ability.
Qualitative results do not change if, instead, a fraction λ, λ ∈ (0, 1), of managers have high
ability.) Managers with ability θL are indexed by l, l ∈ [0, 1]. Managers with ability θH are
indexed by h, h ∈ [0, 1].
At date 1, managers make their investment decisions. Managers can create a perfectly
diversified portfolio and, in addition, gamble. They have the opportunity to invest in a risky
asset which increases the risk of the overall portfolio and decreases the expected return on
the overall portfolio. (For instance, a manager who is restricted to invest in AAA-rated
bonds may have the opportunity to invest in AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities.) To
simplify notation, we normalize the amount of capital available to a manager to 1. Manager l
invests al, al ∈ [0, 1], in the risky asset. Manager h invests ah, ah ∈ [0, 1], in the risky asset.
Managers differ in their ability to create a perfectly diversified portfolio. (Suppose,
for instance, high-ability managers may create a perfectly diversified portfolio at lower costs
than low-ability managers, and investors receive the return of the portfolio net of these costs.
Then, high-ability managers can create such a portfolio with a higher net return than low-
ability managers.) To simplify the model, we assume managers with ability θL can create
a perfectly diversified portfolio which generates a return r0 + θL. Managers with ability θH
can create a perfectly diversified portfolio which generates a return r0 + θH . (Results do
not change if the perfectly diversified portfolios are not risk-free, as long as the returns are
perfectly correlated.)
Managers do not, however, differ in their ability to gamble. (Qualitative results do not
change if managers who have a higher ability to create a perfectly diversified portfolio also
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have a higher ability to gamble.) Each manager can invest in a risky asset with a return R,
R =
{
r+ with probability p
r− with probability 1− p. (1)
We assume
r+ > r0 + θH (2)
and
E[R] = pr+ + (1− p)r− < r0 + θL. (3)
That is, if the risky asset generates a high return, then the return on the risky asset is
higher than the return on the perfectly diversified portfolio for each manager. (For instance,
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities offered a higher yield than other, less risky AAA-
rated bonds.) However, the expected return on the risky asset is lower than the return on
the perfectly diversified portfolio for each manager. (The purpose here is to show that it
may be individually optimal to increase the risk of the portfolio even if this decreases the
expected return on the portfolio. For instance, we want to argue that it might even have
been individually optimal to invest in AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities if the expected
return on these bonds was lower than on other, less risky bonds.)
The return on a manager’s overall portfolio depends on the return on the perfectly
diversified portfolio, the return on the risky asset and the composition of the overall portfolio.
Manager l’s portfolio generates a return Πl,
Πl = r
0 + θL + [R− (r0 + θL)]al. (4)
Manager h’s portfolio generates a return Πh,
Πh = r
0 + θH + [R− (r0 + θH)]ah. (5)
The average portfolio return Π¯ depends on the managers’ investment decisions. An individual
manager’s investment decision, however, has no influence on the average portfolio return
because there is a continuum of managers. The average portfolio return is given by
Π¯ =
1
2
(∫ 1
l=0
Πldl +
∫ 1
h=0
Πhdh
)
(6)
or
Π¯ = r0 +
1
2
{
θL + θH + [R− (r0 + θL)]
∫ 1
l=0
aldl + [R− (r0 + θH)]
∫ 1
h=0
ahdh
}
. (7)
At date 2, returns and payoffs are realized. Managers receive a fixed wage w and a
share s, s ∈ [0, 1], of the realized return. Manager l (h) is fired, if the realized return pil (pih)
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is lower than the average realized return p¯i. If a manager is fired, the manager incurs costs c,
c ∈ R+0 . (These costs may be interpreted as costs of finding a new job.)
The compensation contract and the firing rule are taken as given. If investment restric-
tions were adequate and managers could not gamble, the firing rule would sort out low-ability
from high-ability managers. The main purpose here, however, is not to design an optimal
incentive or sorting scheme; it is to show that if investment restrictions are inadequate and
managers can gamble, such a firing rule may lead to excessive risk taking.
The probability that manager l (h) misses the benchmark depends on the amount al
(ah) the manager invests in the risky asset, and the amount a−l (a−h) the other managers
invest in the risky asset. Let P [Πl < Π¯|al, a−l] (P [Πh < Π¯|ah, a−h]) denote the probability
that manager l (h) misses the benchmark.
Managers are risk-neutral and maximize their expected utility. Manager l chooses al to
solve
max
al∈[0,1]
E[U ] = w + s{r0 + θL + [E[R]− (r0 + θL)]al} − P [Πl < Π¯|al, a−l]c. (8)
Manager h chooses ah to solve
max
ah∈[0,1]
E[U ] = w + s{r0 + θH + [E[R]− (r0 + θH)]ah} − P [Πh < Π¯|ah, a−h]c. (9)
3 The appeal of risky assets
Managers may not maximize the expected return on the overall portfolio because they incur
costs if the realized return is lower than the average realized return. We now examine
investment decisions and characterize possible equilibria. We focus on symmetric7 equilibria
in pure strategies.
Proposition 1 If costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return,
there exists no equilibrium in which no manager invests in the risky asset.
The intuition is straightforward. Consider a manager with low ability and suppose all
other managers do not invest in the risky asset. If the manager does not invest in the risky
asset, the manager misses the benchmark with probability 1. If, by contrast, the manager
7That is, we examine equilibria in which all managers with low ability θL make the same investment
decision and all managers with high ability θH make the same investment decision.
5
invests sufficiently in the risky asset, there are two effects: On the one hand, the expected
return on the overall portfolio decreases. On the other hand, the probability of matching
the benchmark increases. The manager matches the benchmark if the risky asset generates
a high return. If costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return,
the manager hence invests in the risky asset.
Note that the threshold for costs c decreases with the share s of the realized return. If
managers do not receive a share of the realized return (s = 0), a low-ability manager always
invests in the risky asset (i.e. if c ≥ 0 which is satisfied by assumption).
Suppose costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return
and a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Then, there is a linear relationship
between the amount managers with low ability and managers with high ability invest in the
risky asset:
Proposition 2 Suppose costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized
return, and a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Then,
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah. (10)
The intuition is as follows: Suppose costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s
of the realized return and a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Then, both low-
and high-ability managers must invest just as much in the risky asset as is necessary to
match the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return.
There may exist an equilibrium in which only low-ability managers invest in the risky
asset. If high-ability managers invest
ah = 0 (11)
in the risky asset, and low-ability managers invest
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) (12)
in the risky asset, both low- and high-ability managers match the benchmark if the risky
asset generates a high return.
However, there may also exist equilibria in which high-ability managers invest in the
risky asset. If high-ability managers invest
ah = x (13)
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Figure 1: Possible equilibria.
in the risky asset, where 0 < x ≤ 1, low-ability managers have to invest
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) x (14)
in the risky asset to match the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return. And if,
in turn, low-ability managers invest
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) x (15)
in the risky asset, high-ability managers have to invest
ah = x (16)
in the risky asset to match the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return.
Hence, if costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return
and a symmetric equilibrium exists, there is a linear relationship between the amount low-
and high-ability managers invest in the risky asset:
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah. (17)
The more high-ability managers invest in the risky asset, the more low-ability managers
invest in the risky asset, and vice versa.
Possible symmetric equilibria in pure strategies are depicted in figure 1. Note that low-
ability managers, at least, invest in the risky asset (al > 0), and they invest at least as much
as high-ability managers (al ≥ ah).
If costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return, at least
one symmetric equilibrium exists under certain conditions:
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Proposition 3 Suppose costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized
return. Then, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies if and only
if
• the returns r+ and r− of the risky asset are sufficiently large, or
• the probability p that the risky asset generates a high return is sufficiently large in
relation to the share s of the realized return.
The intuition is as follows. There exists at least one equilibrium if and only if there
exists an equilibrium in which high-ability managers invest
ah = 0 (18)
in the risky asset, and low-ability managers invest
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) (19)
in the risky asset. The ‘if’ part is obvious. For the ‘only if’ part, note that if there does not
exist an equilibrium in which only low-ability managers invest in the risky asset, there does
not exist an equilibrium in which both low- and high-ability managers invest in the risky
asset.
There exists an equilibrium in which high-ability managers invest 0 in the risky asset,
and low-ability managers invest θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, if and only if the returns r
+
and r− are sufficiently large, or the probability p is sufficiently large in relation to the share s
of the realized return.8 To see this, consider the investment decisions of high- and low-ability
managers.
First, consider the investment decision of a high-ability manager. Suppose all low-ability
managers invest θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset and all other high-ability managers invest 0 in
the risky asset. If the high-ability manager also invests 0 in the risky asset, the manager
misses the benchmark with probability 0. If, by contrast, the high-ability manager invests
more than 0 in the risky asset, there are two negative effects. First, the expected return on
the overall portfolio decreases. And second, the probability of missing the benchmark may
increase. Hence, the high-ability manager also invests 0 in the risky asset.
Now, consider the investment decision of a low-ability manager. Suppose all high-ability
managers invest 0 in the risky asset and all other low-ability managers invest θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the
8The assumption, however, that the expected return on the risky asset is lower than the return on the
perfectly diversified portfolio still holds.
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risky asset. If the low-ability manager also invests θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, the manager
matches the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return, but misses the benchmark
if the risky asset generates a low return. That is, the manager misses the benchmark with
probability 1− p. If, by contrast, the low-ability manager invests 0 in the risky asset, there
are again two effects. First, the expected return on the overall portfolio increases. Second,
the probability of missing the benchmark changes. The probabiliy of missing the benchmark
now depends on the returns r+ and r− of the risky asset. If r+ and r− are sufficiently large,
the low-ability manager misses the benchmark with probability 1. If r+ and r− are not
sufficiently large, the low-ability manager only misses the benchmark with probability p.
The reason is as follows. (Consider again the investment decision of a low-ability man-
ager, and suppose again the manager invests 0 in the risky asset, while all other low-ability
managers invest θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) and all high-ability managers invest 0 in the risky asset.) If the
risky asset generates a high return, the low-ability manager misses the benchmark in any
case. If the risky asset generates a low return, the manager also misses the benchmark if the
average portfolio return does not suffer much. This is the case if r+ and r− are sufficiently
large. If the return r+ is large, the other low-ability managers do not have to invest much
in the risky asset to match the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return (i.e.
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) is small). And if the return r
− is large, portfolio returns do not suffer much for a
given amount invested in the risky asset if the risky asset generates a low return. Hence, if
r+ and r− are sufficiently large, the low-ability manager misses the benchmark with prob-
ability 1 if the manager does not invest in the risky asset. If r+ and r− are not sufficiently
large, the low-ability manager only misses the benchmark with probability p if the manager
does not invest in the risky asset.
Suppose now the returns r+ and r− are sufficiently large. Then, the low-ability manager
misses the benchmark with probability 1 if the manager does not invest in the risky asset.
Hence, the low-ability manager invests θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset if costs c are sufficiently
large in relation to the share s of the realized return (which is satisfied by assumption).
Note that the threshold for costs c decreases with the share s of the realized return. If
managers do not receive a share of the realized return (s = 0), a low-ability manager invests
in the risky asset if managers incur positive costs if they are fired (c ≥ 0).
Now, suppose the returns r+ and r− are not sufficiently large. Then, the low-ability
manager misses the benchmark with probability p if the manager does not invest in the risky
asset. Hence, the low-ability manager invests θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset if the probability p
that the risky asset generates a high return is sufficiently large in relation to the share s of
the realized return.
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Note that the threshold for probability p decreases with the share s of the realized
return. If managers do not receive a share of the realized return (s = 0), a low-ability
manager invests in the risky asset if a high return is at least as likely as a low return (p ≥ 1
2
).
There may also exist equilibria in which both low- and high-ability managers invest
in the risky asset if the returns r+ and r− are sufficiently large, or the probability p is
sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return. If high-ability managers
invest more than 0 in the risky asset, low-ability managers face a trade-off similar to those
described above. If low-ability managers invest more than θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, high-
ability managers also face a similar trade-off. Suppose low-ability managers invest more
than θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset. Then, if a high-ability manager invests 0 in the risky
asset, the manager misses the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return. If, by
contrast, the high-ability manager invests sufficiently in the risky asset, the manager misses
the benchmark with probability 0. If costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s
of the realized return, the high-ability manager hence invests in the risky asset.
As a result, managers may face a coordination problem. They would be best off if only
low-ability managers invested in the risky asset. However, they may end up in an equilibrium
in which both low- and high-ability managers invest in the risky asset.
4 Conclusion
We argue that fund managers may take excessive risk if they differ in ability, are fired if
they miss the benchmark, and have the opportunity to gamble. If investment restrictions
are adequate, benchmarking may sort out low-ability from high-ability fund managers. If,
however, fund managers have the opportunity to gamble, they may take excessive risk to
match the benchmark.
Investment restrictions are often based on ratings. It can be argued that inflated ratings
increase fund managers’ ability to gamble. Hence, inflated ratings may lead to excessive risk-
taking even if fund managers do not take ratings at face value and know about the risks.
Therefore, it is indeed important that credit rating agencies assign correct ratings.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Consider manager l’s investment decision (choice of al) and suppose all other managers do
not invest in the risky asset (a−l = 0). Then, the average portfolio return is
Π¯ = r0 +
1
2
(θL + θH). (20)
If the manager does not invest in the risky asset (al = 0), the portfolio return is
Πl = r
0 + θL. (21)
The manager hence misses the benchmark with probability 1 and gets the utility
U = w + s(r0 + θL)− c. (22)
The manager’s utility decreases with the amount al invested in the risky asset until al
is sufficiently large such that the portfolio return matches the average portfolio return if the
risky asset generates a return r+. The portfolio return matches the average portfolio return
if R = r+ and
r0 + θL + [r
+ − (r0 + θL)]al = r0 + 1
2
(θL + θH) (23)
or
al =
θH − θL
2[r+ − (r0 + θL)] . (24)
Let
aˆ ≡ θH − θL
2[r+ − (r0 + θL)] (25)
and note that
0 < aˆ < 1. (26)
If the manager chooses al = aˆ, the manager only misses the benchmark with probability
1− p. The manager hence gets the utility
E[U ] = w + s{r0 + θL + [E[R]− (r0 + θL)]aˆ} − (1− p)c. (27)
Starting from al = aˆ, the manager’s utility again decreases with the amount al invested
in the risky asset.
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The manager strictly prefers al = aˆ to al = 0 if
w + s{r0 + θL + [E[R]− (r0 + θL)]aˆ} − (1− p)c > w + s(r0 + θL)− c. (28)
This can be rearranged to get
pc > s(r0 + θL − E[R])aˆ. (29)
Substituting aˆ and rearranging gives
c > s
θH − θL
2p
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) . (30)
Hence, if costs c are sufficiently large in relation to the share s of the realized return, there
exists no equilibrium in which no manager invests in the risky asset.
Proof of proposition 2
Suppose
c > s
θH − θL
2p
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) , (31)
and all managers with low ability θL invest the same amount al in the risky asset and all
managers with high ability θH invest the same amount ah in the risky asset.
First, consider managers with low ability θL. Note that they match the benchmark if
they match managers with high ability θH . If the risky asset generates a high return r
+,
managers with low ability θL match the benchmark if
r0 + θL + [r
+ − (r0 + θL)]al = r0 + θH + [r+ − (r0 + θH)]ah (32)
or
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah. (33)
Let
aˆl(ah) ≡ θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah, (34)
and note that
0 < aˆl(ah) ≤ 1. (35)
There cannot be an equilibrium in which managers with low ability θL invest 0 < al <
aˆl(ah) in the risky asset. Each manager with low ability θL would be better off investing
al = 0 in the risky asset.
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There cannot be an equilibrium in which managers with low ability θL invest al > aˆl(ah)
in the risky asset. Each manager with low ability θL would be better off investing al = aˆl(ah)
in the risky asset.
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium, managers with low ability θL must invest either
al = 0 or al = aˆl(ah) in the risky asset.
Now, consider managers with high ability θH . Note that they fall behind the benchmark
if they fall behind managers with low ability θL. If managers with low ability θL invest
al ≤ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, managers with high ability θH do not fall behind the
benchmark if they invest ah = 0 in the risky asset. If, by contrast, managers with low
ability θL invest al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, managers with high ability θH fall behind
the benchmark if they invest ah = 0 in the risky asset and the risky asset generates a high
return r+.
If al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) and R = r
+, managers with high ability θH do not fall behind the
benchmark if
r0 + θH + [r
+ − (r0 + θH)]ah = r0 + θL + [r+ − (r0 + θL)]al (36)
or
ah = − θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θH) +
r+ − (r0 + θL)
r+ − (r0 + θH)al. (37)
Let
aˆh(al) ≡ − θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θH) +
r+ − (r0 + θL)
r+ − (r0 + θH)al, (38)
and note that
0 < aˆh(al) ≤ 1. (39)
If al ≤ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) , there cannot be an equilibrium in which managers with high ability θH
invest ah > 0 in the risky asset. Each manager with high ability θH would be better off
investing less in the risky asset.
Therefore, if al ≤ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) and there is an equilibrium, managers with high ability θH
must invest ah = 0 in the risky asset.
If al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) , there cannot be an equilibrium in which managers with high ability θH
invest 0 < ah < aˆh(al) in the risky asset. Each manager with high ability θH would be better
off investing ah = 0 in the risky asset.
If al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) , there cannot be an equilibrium in which managers with high ability θH
invest ah > aˆh(al) in the risky asset. Each manager with high ability θH would be better off
investing ah = aˆh(al) in the risky asset.
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Therefore, if al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) and there is an equilibrium, managers with high ability θH
must invest either ah = 0 or ah = aˆh(al) in the risky asset.
By proposition 1, al = 0 and ah = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, if there is an
equilibrium, al ≥ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) .
Note that
aˆh
(
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL)
)
= 0 (40)
and
aˆh(al) = aˆ
−1
l (ah). (41)
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium, there is a linear relationship between the amount
managers with low ability θL and those with high ability θH invest in the risky asset:
al =
θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah. (42)
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose
c ≥ sθH − θL
p
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) . (43)
Let
aˆl(ah) ≡ θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) +
r+ − (r0 + θH)
r+ − (r0 + θL) ah (44)
and
aˆh(al) ≡ − θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θH) +
r+ − (r0 + θL)
r+ − (r0 + θH)al. (45)
There exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if each manager with
low ability θL prefers
al = aˆl(ah) (46)
to
al = 0, (47)
and each manager with high ability θH prefers
ah = aˆh(al) (48)
to
ah = 0. (49)
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First, consider the investment decision of a manager with high ability θH . Then, consider
the investment decision of a manager with low ability θL.
If all managers with low ability θL invest al =
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, aˆh = 0. If
all managers with low ability θL invest al >
θH−θL
r+−(r0+θL) in the risky asset, aˆh > 0. In this
case, each manager with high ability θH prefers ah = aˆh to ah = 0 if
w + s{r0 + θH + [E[R]− (r0 + θH)]aˆh} ≥ w + s(r0 + θH)− pc. (50)
This can be rearranged to get
c ≥ sr
0 + θH − E[R]
p
aˆh. (51)
Now, consider a manager with low ability θL and suppose the manager invests al = 0
in the risky asset. Furthermore, suppose all other managers with low ability θL invest aˆl in
the risky asset and all managers with high ability θH invest aˆh in the risky asset. Then, the
low-ability manager misses the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return r+. If
the risky asset generates a low return r−, the manager also misses the benchmark if
r0 + θL < r
0 +
1
2
{
θL + θH + [r
− − (r0 + θL)]aˆl + [r− − (r0 + θH)]aˆh
}
. (52)
This can be rearranged to get
(r0 + θL − r−)aˆl + (r0 + θH − r−)aˆh < θH − θL. (53)
That is, if the risky asset generates a low return r−, the low-ability manager misses the
benchmark if the other managers do not invest ‘too much’ in the risky asset.
First, suppose
(r0 + θL − r−)aˆl + (r0 + θH − r−)aˆh < θH − θL. (54)
Then, a manager with low ability θL misses the benchmark with probability 1. If, by contrast,
the manager also invests al = aˆl in the risky asset, the manager matches the benchmark if
the risky asset generates a high return r+. That is, the manager only misses the benchmark
with probability 1− p. The manager prefers al = aˆl to al = 0 if
w + s{r0 + θL + [ER− (r0 + θL)]aˆl} − (1− p)c ≥ w + s(r0 + θL)− c. (55)
This can be rearranged to get
c ≥ sr
0 + θL − E[R]
p
aˆl. (56)
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Note that aˆh ≥ 0 and aˆl ≥ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) . Therefore, there exists at least one symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies if
c ≥ sθH − θL
p
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) , (57)
which is satisfied by assumption, and
(r0 + θL − r−) θH − θL
r+ − (r0 + θL) + (r
0 + θH − r−)0 < θH − θL. (58)
The latter condition can be rearranged to get
r+ + r− > 2(r0 + θL). (59)
Now, suppose
(r0 + θL − r−)aˆl + (r0 + θH − r−)aˆh ≥ θH − θL. (60)
Then, if a manager with low ability θL invests al = 0 in the risky asset, the manager only
misses the benchmark if the risky asset generates a high return r+. If, by contrast, the
manager also invests al = aˆl in the risky asset, the manager does not miss the benchmark if
the risky asset generates a high return r+. However, the manager misses the benchmark if
the risky asset generates a low return r−. The manager prefers al = aˆl to al = 0 if
w + s{r0 + θL + [E[R]− (r0 + θL)]aˆl} − (1− p)c ≥ w + s(r0 + θL)− pc. (61)
This can be rearranged to get
p ≥ 1
2
+ s
r0 + θL − E[R]
2c
aˆl. (62)
Note again that aˆh ≥ 0 and aˆl ≥ θH−θLr+−(r0+θL) . Therefore, there exists at least one
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies if
p ≥ 1
2
+ s
θH − θL
2c
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) . (63)
Finally, note that if neither
r+ + r− > 2(r0 + θL) (64)
nor
p ≥ 1
2
+ s
θH − θL
2c
r0 + θL − E[R]
r+ − (r0 + θL) , (65)
there exists no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
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